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Why Were Banks Better Off in the 2001 Recession?
Til Schuermann
In a sharp turnaround from their fortunes in the 1990-91 recession, banks came through 
the 2001 recession reasonably well. A look at industry and economy-wide developments in the 
intervening years suggests that banks fared better largely because of more effective risk
management. In addition, they benefited from a decline in short-term interest rates and the
relative mildness of the 2001 downturn.
T
he 1990-91 recession weighed heavily on banks.
As the institutions entered the downturn,they
were still recovering from the Latin American
debt crisis of the mid-1980s,and they faced new difficulties
with the declining quality of their real estate loans. Low
profits, poor capitalization, and a high incidence of non-
performing loans during this period made it especially hard
for banks to weather the economic setbacks and continue
lending.In the 2001 recession,by contrast,banks were in a
much stronger position.Profits were among the highest in
the past thirty years (Chart 1),and capitalization and loan
quality were more robust than in 1990-91.1
This edition of Current Issues examines why banks fared
better in the most recent recession.Specifically,we con-
sider how much of their success stems from skill on the
part of bank managers and how much stems from simple
luck.Banks play a vital role in the economy,matching the
supply of capital with demand,so knowing how a downturn
affects these organizations is important to understanding
business cycle dynamics.
We find that banks’improved performance in the 2001
recession is attributable in large part to the skill shown by
bank managers.Nevertheless,good fortune also played a
role by creating a more favorable banking environment.
Although we cannot test the relative importance of skill
and luck directly,we look at a range of suggestive evidence.
To analyze the effect of skill on bank performance,we con-
sider two key tools of bank managers: risk management
and the strategic pursuit of new markets and new sources
of revenue.We present evidence that banks are now man-
aging their risks more effectively by adopting risk-based
pricing in several markets.As a result,the institutions are
providing broader access to credit while being compen-
sated for the additional risk they are assuming.We also
show that banks today are using credit derivatives to shift
some portion of their credit exposure to insurers and asset
managers.
The effectiveness of the second tool used by bank man-
agers—the pursuit of new markets and new revenue
sources—is less clear.Gains from geographic diversification
have become harder for certain banks to realize over the
years,and some preliminary research (Stiroh forthcoming a)
suggests that risk-adjusted returns from revenue diver-
sification have not been forthcoming.2
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mance of banks in 2001 rests on two developments, both
beyond the control of bank managers.First,banks benefited
from an environment of rapidly declining short-term inter-
est rates.Such an environment enabled the institutions to
borrow at a lower cost,which in turn increased their interest
margins for a time when they made loans.Second,the 2001
recession—measured by its effect on most major compo-
nents of GDP—was less severe than both the 1990-91 reces-
sion and the average postwar recession.
The Case for Skill:Risk Management
Risk management emerged as a distinct banking discipline
in the 1990s,following the Latin American debt crisis,the
stock market crash,and the onset of turmoil in real estate
lending.3 New tools and techniques to manage market risk
and credit risk were developed,and the banking industry
saw a dramatic increase in the volume and variety of deriva-
tive instruments. With a 1996 amendment to the Basel
Accord,market risk models became part of the regulatory
process.In addition,proposed revisons to the Basel Accord
have been designed to align regulatory capital more closely
with the underlying risks by encouraging more systematic
risk management practices.4Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan recently affirmed the value of these initiatives:
“The use of a growing array of derivatives and the related
application of more sophisticated methods for measuring
and managing risk are key factors underpinning the
enhanced resilience of our largest financial intermediaries.”5
Broadly, effective risk management has the potential to
increase the stability of the economy.More specifically,the use
of risk management tools and techniques can lead to better
risk-based pricing,which in turn can lead to more efficient risk
sharing and capital allocation.Accordingly,to assess the effect
of skill on bank performance,we examine how the institutions
have used risk-based pricing in the syndicated, retail, and
small-business lending markets.We also consider banks’use of
credit derivatives as a risk mitigation instrument.Our findings
suggest that banks have improved their performance between
the 1990-91 and 2001 downturns in large part by integrating
risk management tools in their operations more skillfully.
Risk-Based Pricing in Syndicated Lending
One can argue that risk in the syndicated loan market—
where bank loans to large corporations are syndicated out to
multiple lenders—is not priced as accurately as it is in the
corporate bond market.6 There are several reasons for this
phenomenon.For one,corporate bonds are fairly homoge-
neous instruments,with standard covenants,contracts,and
features.Syndicated loans,by contrast,tend to be more het-
erogeneous, and consequently may be subject to pricing
complications that do not arise with corporate bonds. In
addition,bank lending relationships give banks greater con-
trol rights over the borrowing firm,a degree of flexibility
that is especially valuable when a borrower is in distress.
These control rights are an option that has value to banks,
enabling them to offer a lower price on loans than the price
offered on bonds,all things—such as borrower risk charac-
teristics—being equal. Thus, the menu-price of a spread
above,say,the Treasury rate often does not capture all of the
relevant aspects that govern a contractual lender-debtor
agreement.Still,these reasons cannot fully account for the
difference in pricing between corporate bond and syndi-
cated loans.
By comparing the difference in spreads for the 1990-91 and
2001 recessions,we can determine if risk-based pricing has
penetrated the market more systematically over the 1990s.
Specifically,we compare by credit rating (our measure of risk)
the spreads paid on syndicated loans with those paid on bonds
in the first quarter of each recession, 1990:3 and 2001:1
(Chart 2).For loan spreads,we use data for the all-in spread for
loans rated either by Moody’s or by Standard & Poor’s.The
syndicated lending data are provided by Loan Pricing
Corporation; for bond spreads, we use the above-Treasury
spreads of the Merrill Lynch one-to-three-year corporate bond
index.Because most loans and commitments have relatively
short-term (less than one year) or medium-term (three to five
years) maturities,it seems appropriate to use this bond index.
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Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Historical Statistics
on Banking.
Note: Shaded areas indicate periods designated national recessions by the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Chart 1














02 00 95 90 85 80 75 70 1966
Return on assets
            Scale
Return on equity
Scale         www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 3
Chart 2 displays the pricing schedule for loans and bonds
in the two quarters,as well as the average annual default rate
for U.S.issuers computed from 1981-2002 ratings data from
Standard & Poor’s.We see that the pricing schedule is indeed
flatter in the syndicated loan market: loan spreads do not
follow default rates as closely as bond spreads do.7 However,
loan prices appear to have steepened a little, while bond
prices,curiously,have flattened.We note that the relative price
of risk—the premium for,say,A-rated as opposed to B-rated
debt—need not always be the same.It depends on the risk
appetite of investors active in the market at a point in time.
This relative price of risk is assumed to be reflected in the
bond market.Thus,it is not so much the absolute change in
the pricing schedule that matters,but the relative change.
Next,we define a credit slope much as one might define a
yield curve slope:the mean credit spread ofB-rated less A-rated
debt,value-weighted (Table 1).8 In 1990:3,the loan pricing
schedule was only 19 percent as steep as the bond pricing
schedule, while by 2001:1, it had become 26 percent as
steep—for a total increase of 37 percent.Thus,the pricing
schedule in the syndicated loan market was about one-third
more risk-sensitive in the 2001 recession than in the previ-
ous downturn,suggesting that banks are doing a better job
of incorporating risk in their pricing schedules.
Risk-Based Pricing in Retail and Small-Business Lending
At first glance, banks’ performance in consumer lending
might seem poor,especially when it comes to their credit
card operations. Indeed, the consumer net charge-off
ratio—net charge-offs as a percentage of average loans—
was higher in the 2001 recession than it had been in the pre-
vious one,rising from 1.83 percent in 1990:3 to 2.45 percent
in 2001:1,with a peak of 4.12 percent in 2002:1.If we narrow
our focus to credit card lending,the picture is even starker:
the ratio was 3.56 percent in 1990:3,rose to 4.84 percent in
2001:1,and hit a high of 8.84 percent in 2002:1.
Despite these trends,for the past six to eight quarters,
banks have consistently made positive earnings announce-
ments for their retail operations in general and their retail
lending in particular (Rieker 2002).9 These earnings results,
in light of the high net charge-off ratios,suggest that banks
are being properly compensated for the additional risk they
are assuming; hence,they have likely been managing risk
more effectively between the past two recessions.
This appears to be the case.The literature on consumer
and small-business lending views 1995 as a turning point.
Edelberg (2003) notes that before 1995, credit card rates
were relatively undifferentiated,with banks typically posting
just one “house rate.”After 1995, however, banks’ pricing
schedules steepened,especially for first and second mort-
gages and credit cards.10 Banks were indeed making more
loans to riskier borrowers,but at higher interest rates.The
institutions thus entered the 2001 downturn demonstrating
greater risk sensitivity in their retail loan pricing.
A similar pattern emerges in small-business lending.
Berger (forthcoming),for one,concludes that 1995 was also
a watershed in this market.The year saw the emergence and
rapid adoption of a small-business credit score,analogous to
the credit scores used in consumer lending.11 The credit
score resulted in more differentiated interest rates (a steeper
pricing curve) and made possible more lending to “marginal
applicants.”By factoring this score into their risk pricing,
banks were compensated for the risk they assumed while
expanding their extension of credit. This risk mitigation
trend likewise continued into the 2001 downturn.
Risk Mitigation through Credit Derivatives
Because banks make loans,credit risk is the chief type of risk
they face.Only recently,however,have risk management tools
been designed specifically for this kind of risk. Although
Sources: Author’s calculations, using data from Standard & Poor’s (default rates);
Loan Pricing Corporation (loan spreads); Merrill Lynch (bond spreads).
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Table 1
Defining a Credit Slope
Mean Credit Spread of B-Rated less A-Rated Debt,Value-Weighted 
Loan Slope Bond Slope Loan-to-Bond Slope 
Quarter (Basis Points) (Basis Points) (Percent)
1990:3 206.6 1,072.6 19
2001:1 233.0 883.0 26
Sources:Loan Pricing Corporation;Merrill Lynch.these sometimes complex “credit derivatives” take many
forms,most can be thought of as credit insurance: when a
bank buys such a derivative,another party takes on the credit
risk of the loan or set of loans for a fee.In this way,the bank
purchases credit protection and trims its credit risk.
The credit derivatives market has enjoyed extraordinary
growth over the past five to six years.The most recent biannual
survey by the British Bankers’Association (2002) reports
that the notional volume of these instruments worldwide
increased from $180 billion in 1997 to $1.95 trillion in 2002.
Because of the nature of credit risk,we would expect banks
to be net buyers of protection (net sellers of credit risk).We
would also expect other financial institutions that assume
relatively little credit risk as part of their operations—such
as asset managers,either in the form of insurance companies
or mutual or pension funds—to be net sellers of protection
(net buyers of credit risk).
The British Bankers’Association survey (2002) confirms
these expectations (Chart 3).The chart presents the shares of
credit protection bought and sold in the credit derivatives
market by type of financial institution.It reveals that banks
are indeed the biggest participants as well as the largest net
buyers of credit protection.The chart also shows that insur-
ance companies,especially mono-line insurers12 and rein-
surers,are the largest net sellers of credit insurance.Mutual
and pension funds are also net sellers,although on a smaller
scale. In 2001, commercial banks and securities firms
together transferred out about $350 billion of credit assets,
while insurers assumed more than $500 billion.
The survey findings suggest that there has been a net out-
flow of credit risk from banks to insurers and asset man-
agers.Fitch Ratings (2003) broadly confirms these results;
the agency also reports that U.S.commercial banks are net
exporters of credit risk abroad.Overall,it appears that banks
in recent years have been relying increasingly on credit
derivatives to manage their credit risk more effectively.13
The Case for Skill:Strategic Management
Entry into new markets and the pursuit of untapped revenue
sources—two forms of strategic management—represent a
second tool through which skill might shape bank performance.
By seeking new business opportunities, banks aim to
increase revenues and returns.New ventures,however,bring
new risks,so the returns must be sufficient to compensate
banks for that risk.Geographic diversification may shrink
risk as banks broaden their exposure beyond just a few state
economies, while revenue diversification may actually
increase risk as managers engage in less familiar business
activities.Accordingly,returns and risk cannot be consid-
ered independently in evaluating the success of strategic
management efforts; the risk-adjusted return—the return
divided by the volatility of the return—is also critical.
By the standard of risk-adjusted returns, we find only
some evidence that strategic management efforts have
improved bank performance between the past two reces-
sions. Despite greater geographic diversification among
larger banks, factors such as higher correlations between
state-level business cycles are making bank gains from such
diversification harder to attain.In addition,diversification of
revenue sources does not appear to be contributing in a
meaningful way to bank performance.
Geographic Diversification
The Riegle-Neal Act of 1994,by relaxing interstate branching
restrictions,has enabled banks to widen their geographic
reach. Morgan and Samolyk (2003) find that the average
number of markets in which banks took deposits through
branches grew by 22 percent from 1994 to 2001.14 The
authors develop an index showing that this phenomenon
was particularly pronounced for large banks:the geographic
diversification of banks with more than $50 billion in assets
increased by 74 percent from 1994 to 2001.
Morgan and Samolyk find evidence that diversification has
increased lending capacity,and that banks have taken advan-
tage of it.Loan-to-asset ratios have increased as banks have
expanded geographically.The authors contend that there is no
evidence,however,that diversification has led to better loan
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performance or better returns on assets or equity.This last
conclusion raises a key question:Why hasn’t diversification
brought gains for banks?
In order for banks to realize gains from diversification,
diversification across regions has to be matched by diversifi-
cation in economic returns. Specifically,the extent to which
geographic diversification translates into gains depends on
two factors:correlation and volatility in bank income streams.
For example,ifbank income streams from two different regions
are relatively uncorrelated,then one region’s poor performance
will be partly offset by the other’s good performance.Similarly,
if a bank operates in a region with high income volatility and
adds business from a low-volatility region, overall income
volatility should decline.Unfortunately,we cannot directly
evaluate bank income from specific regions,so we proxy by
using state-level personal income growth.15 We measure
changes in correlation and volatility between the two most
recent recessions and infer what the changes signify for the
benefits of diversification.
Table 2 presents personal income volatility over the ten-
year period prior to the first quarter of the past two reces-
sions: 1981:1 to 1990:3 and 1990:4 to 2001:1.It shows that
the average quarterly volatility of personal income growth
decreased from 1.18 percent in the ten years preceding
1990:3 to 0.98 percent in the ten years before 2001:1. This
result suggests that economic volatility,or risk,is down.Yet
the table also shows that the average correlation in income
growth volatility between states has risen over time,from
37 percent to 46 percent.Thus,although overall fluctuations
are lower,state economies seem to be moving more in tandem.
Once we control for time and state effects—where the time
effect can be viewed as absorbing a national trend in personal
income growth volatility—we find that residual volatility
(that is,state-specific shocks) declines by 26 percent,from
0.98 percent to 0.73 percent (Table 2).In addition,the R2 of
those calculations—the proportion of variance explained by
the time and state effects—increases by 73 percent,from
0.335 to 0.580.Most ofthe variation is absorbed by just the time
(or “national”) effect,where the R2 increases by 84 percent,
from 0.294 to 0.540. Therefore, consistent with Morgan,
Rime,and Strahan (2003),we find that while state business
cycles are getting smaller,they are becoming more alike.
Overall,our findings suggest that if the goal of banks in
expanding geographically is to diversify across state-level
business cycles,they faced an uphill battle in the 1990s,at
least in terms of personal income growth.16 The macro-
economic setting in which banks’diversification strategies
are executed has made success harder to achieve as state
economies become more correlated with one another.
Revenue Diversification
By relaxing business activity constraints,the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999 helped pave the way for banks to diversify
their revenue sources.Indeed,the share of banks’income
from noninterest sources—such as service charges, fidu-
ciary income,trading revenue,and fees—has been rising
steadily,from about 20.3 percent in 1980 to 41.9 percent in
2002 (Stiroh forthcoming a).
However, as Stiroh (forthcoming a) and Stiroh and
Rumble (2003) show,this revenue has migrated into high-
volatility services,offsetting the diversification benefits that
banks realized from the weak correlation between different
income sources.17 From 1997:1 to 2002:4,the annual volatil-
ity of banks’net interest income,21 percent,was lower than
the volatility of any component of their noninterest income
(Table 3).Overall,these studies find that for the typical bank,
risk-adjusted returns on equity fell as the share of noninter-
est income rose.18 A heightened emphasis on the cross-
selling of products and services to existing customers,which
increased bank exposure to the economic setbacks of these
customers,is a possible explanation for this occurrence.
Table 2
Personal Income Growth Volatility Prior to the Two Most
Recent Recessions
Percent
Category 1981:1- 1990:3 1990:4- 2001:1 Change
Average volatility (quarterly) 1.18 0.98 -17
Average correlation 37 46 24
Residual volatility
(time and state effects) 0.98 0.73 -26
R2(time and state effects) 33.5 58.0 73
R2(time effects) 29.4 54.0 84
Source:U.S.Department of Commerce,Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Table 3
Components and Volatility of Banks’Noninterest Income
Sources,1997:1-2002:4
Percent
Source Share of Total Noninterest Income Volatility (Annual)
Service charges 14 28
Fiduciary income 14 34
Trading revenue 8 269
Fees and other income 64 54
Source:Federal Reserve FR Y-9C Reports,from Stiroh and Rumble (2003).The Case for Luck
Two developments suggest that banks also benefited from a
favorable operating environment as they entered the 2001
recession.First,interest rate changes aided banks.On aver-
age,bank assets tend to have longer maturities than bank
liabilities.Therefore,a drop in short-term rates and the con-
sequent steepening of the yield curve enable banks to
increase their interest margins for a time by reducing bor-
rowing costs.In the 2001 recession,the yield curve steep-
ened early and quickly, benefiting banks. (The curve was
actually inverted in the pre-recession quarter.) Overall,
banks can hedge this interest rate risk through the use of
interest rate derivatives,which,to be sure,can be costly.19
To put the 2001 recession in perspective,we examine the
slope ofthe yield curve:the difference between yields on ten-
year and three-month Treasury maturities.We find that the
change in the slope was 1.40 percentage points in the first
quarter of the 2001 recession,a 37 percent increase from the
change of 1.02 percentage points in the first quarter of the
1990-91 recession.Therefore,the interest rate environment
was more favorable for banks at the beginning of the 2001
downturn than it was at the start of the prior recession.
Second,general macroeconomic conditions in the 2001
recession worked to the advantage of banks.Because these
institutions lend to firms across all industries, bank prof-
itability is typically tied to the business cycle.Simply put,
when firms do well,so do banks,and vice versa.In terms 
of real GDP levels,the 2001 recession was milder than both
the 1990-91 downturn and the average postwar recession
(Chart 4).Although all major components of GDP did not
experience a mild recession in 2001,20 developments overall
pointed to beneficial macroeconomic conditions for banks.21
Conclusion
Banks entered the 2001 downturn with better profitability,
more robust balance sheets,and significantly lower nonper-
forming loan ratios than they had shown at the start of the
1990-91 recession.We argue that this improved performance
stems in large part from better risk management on the part
of banks,although luck was a contributing factor.
We find that risk management tools are being integrated
more effectively in bank decision making,suggesting that
the efforts of banks (and regulators) to achieve this goal are
paying off.For example,banks have improved their ability to
price the risk they assume,as evidenced by the shrinking
relative spreads of loans to corporate bonds in the syndi-
cated loan market and the steeper pricing schedules in retail
and small-business lending. Moreover, banks have used
credit derivatives effectively to prune credit risk.
The evidence that strategic management efforts have
improved bank performance is less persuasive. Although
larger banks are becoming more diversified geographically,
this has not translated into higher profitability.Moreover,
state-level business cycles are becoming more alike,suggest-
ingthat the potential benefits of interstate diversification are
declining. The gains from revenue diversification, mean-
while,appear thus far to be negligible.Although banks have
steadily earned a larger share of their income from noninterest
sources, it has come at the cost of increased return-on-
equity volatility and decreased risk-adjusted returns.
Bank efforts to manage risk were also complemented by
the rapidly declining short-term interest rates associated
with the 2001 recession.These rate declines made it easier for
banks to increase their interest rate margins.In addition,the
recession of 2001 was relatively mild when compared with
the 1990-91 downturn and the average postwar recession.
Notes
1. Comparing 1991 with 2002, we note that bank profits rose from 0.52 percent to
1.33 percent in terms of return on assets and nearly doubled, from 7.74 percent to
14.53 percent, as measured by return on equity. Bank capitalization—equity capi-
tal as a percentage of total assets—rose from 6.75 percent to 9.16 percent, and
nonperforming loan ratios fell from 3.70 percent to 1.46 percent.
Regulatory activity no doubt played a role in some of these developments. The
1988 Basel Capital Accord required banks to maintain an 8 percent capital ratio. In
addition, passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
in 1992 placed banks under closer supervisory scrutiny. We note, too, that bank
balance sheets during the 2001 downturn were not weakened by a deterioration in
commercial real estate loans.
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2. On the impact of revenue diversification, see also Gary Silverman and
Charles Pretzlik, “The Myth of the Mega-Bank: After the Failures of
Diversification, Wary Lenders Scale Back Their Global Ambitions,” Financial
Times, January 6, 2004, p. 11. 
3. See Jorion (2001, chapter 1) for a brief history of risk management.
4. See Joint Forum (2001) for more on the increased adaptation and use of risk
management techniques by financial services firms.
5. The full remarks, delivered May 8, 2003, are available at <http://www.
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20030508/default.htm>.
6. Bankers Trust developed its RAROC (risk-adjusted return on capital) 
system in the 1970s specifically to address this issue (Jorion 2001).
7. Recoveries on defaulted bank loans tend to be somewhat higher than on
corporate bonds, an observation that helps explain some of the difference.
8. We choose B- and A-rated debt because we have significantly more observa-
tions in these grades than in higher grades, such as AA.
9. Retail lending includes several other categories, most notably mortgage
lending, another product that has been quite profitable for banks.
10. Several studies on this topic are collected in Durkin and Staten (2002).
11. Also see Berger, Frame, and Miller (2002).
12. Mono-line insurers write only one line of business, such as workers’ com-
pensation or credit insurance (for instance, mortgage guaranty underwriting). 
13. Certainly, mostly large banks participate in this market, so any credit risk
transfer by means of credit derivatives is likely limited to this segment.
14. Markets are defined as metropolitan statistical areas and rural areas.
15. We use state-level personal income growth rather than gross state product
because of the former’s higher reporting frequency: quarterly, as opposed to
annual.
16. Our results are even more pronounced when we remove transfer payments.
17. Moreover, Stiroh and Rumble (2003) find that the correlation between inter-
est and noninterest income actually increased during the 1990s.
18. Stiroh (forthcoming b) reports similar results for community banks.
19. The derivatives’ overall effectiveness is hard to measure precisely.
20. For example, real investment in equipment and software fared worse than it
did during the average recession.
21. There may also have been what economists call an endogenous effect: the
2001 recession may have been milder because better capitalized banks are more
able to extend credit to firms facing weaker demand for products or services.
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